Dr Rainer Nitsche is a director and one of the founders of E.CA Economics. He is an expert in providing economic advice in competition and litigation cases before the European Commission and many national competition authorities. He also regularly acts as a court expert in cartel and merger cases. Mr Nitsche has also published widely on competition economics.

Looking back over your career, what has been your proudest achievement so far?

I am proud of E.CA Economics and feel fortunate to have had the opportunity to contribute to its success. It is difficult for me to choose a single accomplishment. Throughout my career, I have been privileged to be involved in many high-profile cases. However, the cases I am most proud of are those where I feel we (as a team at E.CA Economics) made a real impact by being thorough, creative, robust and persuasive in our analysis.

What is one thing you wish you knew before practising as a competition economist?

Just do it – it’s fun.

Practitioners have identified a trend of bread-and-butter work such as distribution agreements now being done in-house. How might this impact the legal market?

While the emerging trend may present challenges for law firms, it also presents an opportunity for adaptation, innovation and a shift towards the provision of higher value legal services. The legal market is likely to continue to evolve in response to changing client needs, and legal practitioners must be prepared to adapt their strategies to remain relevant and competitive.

To what extent has the shift to online technologies made it easier to reach and interact with competition authorities?

The adoption of online communication channels has undoubtedly improved the convenience and efficiency of engaging with regulatory bodies - especially as many of us operate in multiple jurisdictions.

How should competition enforcement work in relation to the likes of big tech companies like Microsoft, Google and Amazon?

Competition enforcement should focus on the impact of the behaviour of large technology companies on consumer welfare. This requires both addressing the potential for an abuse of market power and considering the benefits of concentration arising from positive network effects, which are often the source of market power but can also create significant value for its users. Competition enforcement in digital markets requires careful attention to complex trade-offs. For example, measures to foster interoperability and data portability may directly benefit users, help smaller platforms to grow and promote competition in services. At the same time, such regulatory intervention will also affect the incentives to innovate (of the gatekeeper and of competitors, with potentially different signs) and the level of privacy protection. The big challenge is to balance all the relevant effects on consumers.

How important is it for practitioners to be familiar with regimes of different jurisdictions?

In multi-jurisdictional cases, competition economists often support legal teams in several jurisdictions at the same time. It is therefore important to understand the key differences between jurisdictions. However, local legal teams are excellent at pointing out the critical aspects of a local regime, and economic concepts - such as consumer welfare - do not depend on a jurisdiction. It is therefore easier for economists to provide services across jurisdictions than for lawyers.

The German Competition Law Reform increased the standard merger control thresholds in Germany. How has this impacted the mergers market in Germany?

A full assessment would have to consider the impact on the number of mergers brought, the costs of enforcement as well as the effects on under- and over-enforcement. I believe that a full assessment is still pending.

To what extent will the increased focus on consumer protection in competition cases impact practice?

Competition enforcement is there to protect consumers. Thus, competition cases should always have focused on consumer welfare. To the extent that competition law is a substitute for broader regulation that also protects consumers who do not interact with gatekeepers or firms with market power, it is not helpful to deal with consumer protection issues in competition cases, as broader regulation would be better for consumers. To the extent that competition law is blurred by the introduction of too many objectives, it will weaken competition enforcement: it opens the door to more arbitrary decision making, as some decisions will depend on the weighing of objectives. This is helpful for lobbyists, but not for economists who prefer decisions based on rigorous analysis of the effects on consumer welfare.